President Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor for Supreme Court

Sonia Sotomayor Pres­i­dent Oba­ma today announced (CNN sto­ry and video) his nom­i­na­tion of Sonia Sotomay­or, cur­rent­ly a Judge on the Sec­ond Cir­cuit, to fill the posi­tion on the US Supreme Court to be vacat­ed by the res­ig­na­tion of Jus­tice David Souter.

With­in a few hours of Pres­i­dent Oba­ma’s announce­ment, the CATO Insti­tute and The Her­itage Foun­da­tion had sig­nif­i­cant arti­cles devot­ed to attack­ing the nom­i­na­tion. Rush Lim­baugh this after­noon called Judge Sotomay­or a “racist”. Sean Han­ni­ty called her a “rad­i­cal” who had made “out­ra­geous” and “amaz­ing” state­ments. The lib­er­al sites raced out arti­cles attack­ing the attack­ers and defend­ing Judge Sotomay­or (Talk­ing Points Memo and The Huff­in­g­ton Post).

The first item that has been cir­cu­lat­ing about Judge Sotomay­or is a state­ment she made about appel­late courts mak­ing “pol­i­cy” dur­ing a pan­el dis­cus­sion at Duke Uni­ver­si­ty in 2005 (note: this clip is length­i­er, and pro­vides much more con­text, than the clips played on most news sites):

This state­ment is being used to char­ac­ter­ize Sotomay­or as an “activist” judge who does­n’t rec­og­nize that judges “inter­pret” (but do not “cre­ate”) law. Per­son­al­ly, I think that argu­ment is non­sense. Judges all the time ana­lyze statu­to­ry and con­sti­tu­tion­al issues by con­sid­er­ing the impact in the real world of their poten­tial deci­sions. Those are “pol­i­cy” con­sid­er­a­tions. For example:

  • If an employ­ee has to file a charge of dis­crim­i­na­tion with the EEOC with­in 300 days of the “unlaw­ful employ­ment prac­tice”, does that mean 300 days of the neg­a­tive per­for­mance review that results in low­er pay for the employ­ee, or with­in 300 days of each pay check the employ­ee receives pur­suant to the neg­a­tive per­for­mance review? That was the issue in Led­bet­ter v. Goodyear Tire & Rub­ber Com­pa­ny, 550 U.S. 618, 128 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).The Supreme Court in Led­bet­ter made a num­ber of pol­i­cy-based argu­ments in favor of its lim­i­ta­tion rule, includ­ing dis­cus­sion of a “pol­i­cy of repose” which makes it “unfair” for the wronged par­ty not to put the employ­er on notice of a claim with­in a spe­cif­ic peri­od of time. See my dis­cus­sion in this blog of the decision.
  • If employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion law pro­hibits retal­i­a­tion against an employ­ee who oppos­es dis­crim­i­na­to­ry con­duct, what is the lev­el of sever­i­ty of the employ­er’s action that is nec­es­sary for the courts to rec­og­nize a retal­i­a­tion claim? That was the issue in Burling­ton North­ern & Sante Fe Rail­way Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  The Supreme Court exam­ined a broad range of pol­i­cy con­sid­er­a­tions that focused on the bur­dens on employ­ers of var­i­ous pos­si­ble rul­ings, and whether employ­ee com­plaints would be encour­aged or dis­cour­aged by pos­si­ble rul­ings. See my dis­cus­sion in this blog on the decision.

There is sim­ply no bright (or mud­dy) line between “law” and “pol­i­cy”, and judges rou­tine­ly for­mu­late the most appro­pri­ate rule of law by exam­in­ing how the var­i­ous options are con­sis­tent with or pro­mote var­i­ous pol­i­cy considerations.

By the time a case gets to the lev­el of a court of appeals, the judges are fre­quent­ly pre­sent­ed with com­pet­ing pol­i­cy con­sid­er­a­tions which the par­ties will argue under­gird a pro­posed inter­pre­ta­tion of a statute or a con­sti­tu­tion­al pro­vi­sion. For exam­ple, in Led­bet­ter v. Goodyear Tire & Rub­ber Com­pa­ny, 550 U.S. 618, 128 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), the Supreme Court had to inter­pret a pro­vi­sion of Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964 which dealt with when a per­son has to file a charge of dis­crim­i­na­tion with the EEOC. With­in 300 days of a dis­crim­i­na­to­ry per­for­mance review in (for exam­ple) 2001 which sup­pressed a wom­an’s pay checks com­pared to her male peers, or with­in 300 days of a dis­crim­i­na­to­ry pay check she received in 2008 as a con­se­quence of that per­for­mance review? It would be intel­lec­tu­al­ly dis­hon­est to sug­gest that the answer was crys­tal clear from the lan­guage of the statute. So the Courts, rou­tine­ly, exam­ine the pol­i­cy con­sid­er­a­tion behind the statute in ques­tion. In Led­bet­ter, here is an incom­plete list of the com­pet­ing pol­i­cy con­sid­er­a­tions that were rel­e­vant to the Court’s deci­sion, and all of these poli­cies are unar­guably reflect­ed in the statute (Title VII) and rel­e­vant legal principles:

  • The pol­i­cy that Title VII should pro­vide a rem­e­dy to the employ­ee for dis­crim­i­na­to­ry deci­sions by employers.
  • The pol­i­cy that Title VII should act as a deter­rent to pre­vent future dis­crim­i­na­tion by employers.
  • The pol­i­cy that claims should be pre­sent­ed with rea­son­able prompt­ness to give defen­dants fair notice of the claims.
  • The pol­i­cy that claims should be pre­sent­ed with rea­son­able prompt­ness because claims can be adju­di­cat­ed more com­pe­tent­ly before wit­ness­es, mem­o­ries, doc­u­ments, or oth­er evi­dence fade or disappear.

The Supreme Court in Led­bet­ter focused on the poli­cies relat­ing to prompt pre­sen­ta­tion of claims, and ruled that Led­bet­ter was required to file her charge with the EEOC with­in 300 days of the dis­crim­i­na­to­ry per­for­mance review. The dis­sent in Led­bet­ter focused on the reme­di­al and pre­ven­tive poli­cies in Title VII. Con­gress then over­ruled the Led­bet­ter deci­sion and con­clud­ed that the Supreme Court had mis­in­ter­pret­ed the rel­e­vant pro­vi­sions in and poli­cies of Title VII. The Supreme court, in its deci­sion, by any rea­son­able def­i­n­i­tion, “made pol­i­cy” in the result it reached. So did Congress.

Stay tuned, and I’ll dis­cuss the Sotomay­or nom­i­na­tion in com­ing days and weeks.

Drew M. Capuder
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