Can you be sexually harassed behind your back?

It might be obvi­ous, but it seems a bit dif­fi­cult to win on a claim for sex­u­al harass­ment where all of the harass­ment occurs behind your back (and by “behind your back”, I mean sit­u­a­tions where the harass­ing behav­ior occurs when the com­plain­ing employ­ee is not phys­i­cal­ly present to expe­ri­ence or hear what is happening).

The Fourth Cir­cuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2009), in a unan­i­mous deci­sion writ­ten by Judge Roger Gre­go­ry in which Judges M. Blane Michael and Robert Bruce King joined.

The Fourth Cir­cuit did­n’t have much dif­fi­cul­ty reach­ing the con­clu­sion that, for any claim alleg­ing a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment (includ­ing sex­u­al harass­ment), you can’t suc­ceed if all of the mis­con­duct about which you com­plain occurred at work when you were not at work.

Twenty-Eight Years of Litigation!!!

This case grows out of an incred­i­bly long his­to­ry of lit­i­ga­tion (includ­ing sev­er­al dif­fer­ent law­suits and appeals (some of which were suc­cess­ful)) filed by Ms. Pueschel against her employ­er, the Fed­er­al Avi­a­tion Admin­is­tra­tion (“FAA”). The lit­i­ga­tion start­ed in 1981 and end­ed with this Fourth Cir­cuit deci­sion in 2009 (I am not kid­ding, and I am not sure this deci­sion marks the end of all of her litigation).

I’ll fast-for­ward past the first decade or so of lit­i­ga­tion. In 1994, Ms. Pueschel went on leave with­out pay (“LWOP”) from her job at the FAA after she claimed to suf­fer a “stress-relat­ed episode at work”. She claimed that this required her to leave work per­ma­nent­ly. She remained on LWOP until she was ter­mi­nat­ed in 1999 because of her inabil­i­ty to work, and she nev­er returned to work at the FAA.

Ms. Pueschel filed a num­ber of dis­crim­i­na­tion admin­is­tra­tive charges between 1997 and 1999, and the key alle­ga­tion that I will focus on in this arti­cle was that she was sub­ject­ed to a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment in 1997 and 1998 (keep­ing in mind that she was not at work after 1994). Ms. Pueschel claimed that the hos­tile work envi­ron­ment was based on her gen­der and dis­abil­i­ty, and based on the fact that she had filed charges of dis­crim­i­na­tion against the FAA. These charges led to a law­suit in which the tri­al judge grant­ed the FAA’s motion for sum­ma­ry judg­ment on Ms. Pueschel’s hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights of 1964.

So the Fourth Cir­cuit had to decide whether Ms. Pueschel had a viable hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim based on her gen­der and her dis­abil­i­ty and her pri­or charges of discrimination.

I described Ms. Pueschel’s claim at the begin­ning of this arti­cle as “sex­u­al harass­ment” for the sake of con­ve­nience to describe the issue, but her hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim was more com­pli­cat­ed than that. She alleged that co-work­ers were mak­ing ugly, pro­fane, and degrad­ing com­ments about her, and the com­ments were not “sex­u­al” in a con­ven­tion­al sense. The insults were that she was a “fuck­ing bitch”, “noth­ing but a bitch”, a “use­less bitch”, and oth­er sim­i­lar statements.

Fourth Circuit’s Analysis

The first impor­tant thing about the Fourth Cir­cuit’s analy­sis is that it assumed that a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim can be pred­i­cat­ed on any pro­tect­ed char­ac­ter­is­tic under the employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion laws. It described the basic require­ments (pri­ma facie case) of a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim, and said the plain­tiff must demon­strate that the alleged conduct:

  • was unwel­come;
  • result­ed because of her gen­der, dis­abil­i­ty, or oth­er pro­tect­ed activ­i­ty;
  • was “suf­fi­cient­ly severe or per­va­sive” to alter the con­di­tions of her employ­ment; and
  • was imputable to her employer.

(my empha­sis is added). Some courts have ques­tioned whether hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claims can be based on any char­ac­ter­is­tics oth­er than gen­der and race. But the Fourth Cir­cuit’s lan­guage in ele­ment 2 above (“based on gen­der, dis­abil­i­ty, or oth­er pro­tect­ed activ­i­ty”) clear­ly rec­og­nizes that a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment may be moti­vat­ed by most or all of the pro­tect­ed char­ac­ter­is­tics under the employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion laws. That means that hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claims in prin­ci­ple may be based on gen­der (con­ven­tion­al sex­u­al harass­ment), race (racist com­ments), dis­abil­i­ty, age, nation­al ori­gin, and religion.

The sec­ond impor­tant thing about the Fourth Cir­cuit’s analy­sis is that it concluded–perhaps stat­ing the obvious–that Ms. Pueschel could not pre­vail on her hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim because she left her FAA employ­ment per­ma­nent­ly start­ing in 1994, and all of the abu­sive con­duct occurred at work in 1997 and 1998 after her employ­ment end­ed. In oth­er words, she was not present at work, so the insult­ing state­ments at work could not cre­ate a hos­tile or abu­sive work envi­ron­ment for her.

Lingering Issues

The hold­ing in this case does not mean that the plain­tiff-employ­ee must always be phys­i­cal­ly present while offen­sive work­place behav­ior is occur­ring. Abu­sive con­duct may be rel­e­vant and admis­si­ble in var­i­ous set­tings where the plain­tiff is not phys­i­cal­ly present, but these cir­cum­stances will gen­er­al­ly require that the plain­tiff still be employed at the time of the events. Here are the sce­nar­ios where the con­duct may still sup­port a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claim (and I’ll use sex­u­al harass­ment con­duct as the example):

  • Boss makes sex­u­al­ly offen­sive state­ments about female employ­ee (plain­tiff) while plain­tiff is not present, but anoth­er employ­ee lat­er tells the plain­tiff about the state­ments. Courts don’t have a lot of trou­ble con­clud­ing that this sort of after-the-fact knowl­edge about the harass­ing state­ments con­tributes to a hos­tile work environment.
  • Boss makes sex­u­al­ly offen­sive state­ments about plain­tiff, no one ever tells plain­tiff, and boss denies ever mak­ing oth­er sex­u­al­ly offen­sive remarks direct­ly to the plain­tiff. Under those cir­cum­stances, even though the boss’s state­ments did not con­tribute to a hos­tile work envi­ron­ment for the plain­tiff, the state­ments out­side of the pres­ence of the plain­tiff are like­ly to be admis­si­ble on the dis­put­ed issue of whether the boss ever made sex­u­al­ly offen­sive state­ments direct­ly to the plaintiff.
  • Boss sex­u­al­ly harass­es oth­er women (oth­er than the plain­tiff) out­side the pres­ence of the plain­tiff. That harass­ment may be admis­si­ble in plain­tiff’s case under 2 cir­cum­stances: (a) plain­tiff claims to have been told about that harass­ment while she was still work­ing for employ­er, and she cred­i­bly claims her after-the-fact knowl­edge con­tributed to the hos­tile work envi­ron­ment, and (b) even if plain­tiff did not learn about it after the fact, the harass­ment of oth­er women may be admis­si­ble on the dis­put­ed issue of whether the boss sex­u­al­ly harassed the plaintiff.
Drew M. Capuder
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