FMLA now applies to leave for care of children by same-sex couples

The Unit­ed States Depart­ment of Labor recent­ly issued an Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion 2010–3 which applies leave rights under the Fam­i­ly and Med­ical Leave Act to care of chil­dren by same-sex cou­ples. The US Depart­ment of Labor issued a press release to help explain the Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion. In oth­er words, employ­ees in same-sex rela­tion­ships who qual­i­fy for leave under the FMLA will be enti­tled to pro­tect­ed leave for the qual­i­fy­ing care of their children.

As the DOL’s press release suc­cinct­ly says, the “FMLA allows work­ers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave dur­ing any 12-month peri­od to care for loved ones or them­selves”. (29 U.S.C. 2612; 29 C.F.R. 825.200).

What is a “son or daughter”?

The key issue was when the child fell into the def­i­n­i­tion of “son or daugh­ter” for the employ­ee seek­ing leave. When does the law rec­og­nize the child as the “son or daugh­ter” of the employee?

Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion 2010–3 sets out the statu­to­ry lan­guage, and same-sex cou­ples now have the nec­es­sary rela­tion­ship to the child through the sta­tus of being “in loco par­en­tis”, which more or less means some­one who “stands in the place” of the par­ent. Here is the dis­cus­sion in the Administrator’s Interpretation:

The FMLA enti­tles an eli­gi­ble employ­ee to take up to 12 work­weeks of job-pro­tect­ed leave, in rel­e­vant part, “[b]ecause of the birth of a son or daugh­ter of the employ­ee and in order to care for such son or daugh­ter,” “[b]ecause of the place­ment of a son or daugh­ter with the employ­ee for adop­tion or fos­ter care,” and to care for a son or daugh­ter with a seri­ous health con­di­tion. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) — ©; 29 C.F.R. § 825.200. The FMLA defines a “son or daugh­ter” as a “bio­log­i­cal, adopt­ed, or fos­ter child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a per­son stand­ing in loco par­en­tis, who is— (A) under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or old­er and inca­pable of self-care because of a men­tal or phys­i­cal dis­abil­i­ty.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.122©, 825.800.

(empha­sis added).

“Son or daughter” applies to same-sex couples

The Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion then explains that “son or daugh­ter” was intend­ed in the FMLA to apply to chil­dren in non-tra­di­tion­al fam­i­ly settings:

Con­gress intend­ed the def­i­n­i­tion of “son or daugh­ter” to reflect “the real­i­ty that many chil­dren in the Unit­ed States today do not live in tra­di­tion­al ‘nuclear’ fam­i­lies with their bio­log­i­cal father and moth­er. Increas­ing­ly, those who find them­selves in need of work­place accom­mo­da­tion of their child care respon­si­bil­i­ties are not the bio­log­i­cal par­ent of the chil­dren they care for, but their adop­tive, step, or fos­ter par­ents, their guardians, or some­times sim­ply their grand­par­ents or oth­er rel­a­tives or adults.” See S. Rep. No. 103–3, at 22. Con­gress stat­ed that the def­i­n­i­tion was intend­ed to be “con­strued to ensure that an employ­ee who actu­al­ly has day-to-day respon­si­bil­i­ty for car­ing for a child is enti­tled to leave even if the employ­ee does not have a bio­log­i­cal or legal rela­tion­ship to that child.” Id.

In loco par­en­tis is com­mon­ly under­stood to refer to “a per­son who has put him­self in the sit­u­a­tion of a law­ful par­ent by assum­ing the oblig­a­tions inci­dent to the parental rela­tion with­out going through the for­mal­i­ties nec­es­sary to legal adop­tion. It embod­ies the two ideas of assum­ing the parental sta­tus and dis­charg­ing the parental duties.” Niewiadom­s­ki v. U.S., 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947) (quo­ta­tions omit­ted). Black’s Law Dic­tio­nary defines the term in loco par­en­tis as “in the place of a par­ent.” Black’s Law Dic­tio­nary 803 (8th ed. 2004). “The key in deter­min­ing whether the rela­tion­ship of in loco par­en­tis is estab­lished is found in the inten­tion of the per­son alleged­ly in loco par­en­tis to assume the sta­tus of a par­ent toward the child. The intent to assume such parental sta­tus can be inferred from the acts of the par­ties.” Dil­lon v. Mary­land-Nation­al Cap­i­tal Park and Plan­ning Comm’n, 382 F. Supp. 2d 777, 787 (D. Md. 2005), aff’d 258 Fed. Appx. 577 (4th Cir. 2007) (cita­tions omit­ted; empha­sis in original).

(empha­sis added). It then fol­lows that

an employ­ee who will share equal­ly in the rais­ing of an adopt­ed child with a same sex part­ner, but who does not have a legal rela­tion­ship with the child, would be enti­tled to leave to bond with the child fol­low­ing place­ment, or to care for the child if the child had a seri­ous health con­di­tion, because the employ­ee stands in loco par­en­tis to the child.

The press release sum­ma­rizes the effect of the Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion to apply the FMLA leave rights to employ­ees in non-tra­di­tion­al parental rela­tion­ships, includ­ing same-sex couples:

As the inter­pre­ta­tion makes clear, an uncle who is car­ing for his young niece and nephew when their sin­gle par­ent has been called to active mil­i­tary duty may exer­cise his right to fam­i­ly leave. Like­wise, a grand­moth­er who assumes respon­si­bil­i­ty for her sick grand­child when her own child is debil­i­tat­ed will be able to seek fam­i­ly and med­ical leave from her employ­er. And an employ­ee who intends to share in the par­ent­ing of a child with his or her same sex part­ner will be able to exer­cise the right to FMLA leave to bond with that child.

(empha­sis added).

Employ­ers will obvi­ous­ly want to review their FMLA leave poli­cies in light of Administrator’s Inter­pre­ta­tion 2010–3Click here for the DOL’s Com­pli­ance Assis­tance page for the FMLA.

Drew M. Capuder
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