All posts by Drew M. Capuder

Publisher of Drew Capuder's Employment Law Blog. Lawyer with more than 30 years of experience, focusing on employment law, commercial litigation, and mediation. Extensive trial and appellate experience in state and federal courts. Call Drew at 304-333-5261.

Favorite quotes about the law, part 1

Maybe it’s the frus­trat­ed nov­el­ist in me, but I’ve been think­ing about lit­er­a­ture and law.

This arti­cle is the start of a series where, once in a while and for no par­tic­u­lar rea­son, I will focus on thought pro­vok­ing and even pro­found state­ments (by oth­ers) about the law. Some­times the quo­ta­tions will be from lit­er­a­ture, and some­times they will be from legal writ­ings, philo­soph­i­cal works, and from darn near any­thing else that makes us think about the nature of law and its rela­tion­ship to society.

So let’s begin …

Con­tin­ue read­ing Favorite quotes about the law, part 1

Fifth Circuit applies hostile work environment to age claims

Courts have some­times ques­tioned whether hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claims apply to all “fla­vors” of dis­crim­i­na­tion. Hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claims most fre­quent­ly arise in claims of sex dis­crim­i­na­tion  and race dis­crim­i­na­tion claims under Title VII of the Civ­il Rights Act of 1964, but age dis­crim­i­na­tion claims under fed­er­al law arise under a dif­fer­ent statute, the Age Dis­crim­i­na­tion in Employ­ment Act of 1967.

The Fifth Cir­cuit direct­ly held recent­ly that hos­tile work envi­ron­ment claims are encom­passed by age dis­crim­i­na­tion claims under the ADEA in Dedi­ol v. Best Chevro­let, Inc., — F.3d — (5th Cir. Sep­tem­ber 12, 2011).

Con­tin­ue read­ing Fifth Cir­cuit applies hos­tile work envi­ron­ment to age claims

US Supreme Court Rules for Employee on “Cat’s Paw” Theory

The Unit­ed States Supreme Court recent­ly unan­i­mous­ly issued a major vic­to­ry for employ­ees under “USERRA”, the Uni­formed Ser­vices Employ­ment and Reem­ploy­ment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., on the “cat’s paw” the­o­ry in employ­ment dis­crim­i­na­tion claims. The deci­sion was in Staub v. Proc­tor Hos­pi­tal, — U.S. — (March 1, 2011) (opin­ion at Google Schol­ar). Jus­tice Scalia wrote the opin­ion for the unan­i­mous court. Jus­tice Ali­to wrote an opin­ion con­cur­ring in the judg­ment, which Jus­tice Thomas joined. Jus­tice Kagan did not par­tic­i­pate in the decision.

What is the “Cat’s Paw” Scenario?

Drew's kitty-cat, HannaSo, what the heck is the “cat’s paw” the­o­ry? Does it explain why my cat, pic­tured at the left, is star­ing so intent­ly at you?

First, to define “cat’s paw” in a non-legal con­text, the Webster’s Online dic­tio­nary defines a “cat’s paw” as: “A per­son used by anoth­er to gain an end.” The term aris­es out of a fable in which a a shrewd mon­key tricks a cat into pulling roast­ing chest­nuts out of a fire—the cat gets its paw burned, and the mon­key gets the chest­nuts and scam­pers away unhurt.

Con­tin­ue read­ing US Supreme Court Rules for Employ­ee on “Cat’s Paw” The­o­ry

Legislative Update: Pending bill would expand sick leave rights for West Virginia employees

House Bill 2770, which was recent­ly intro­duced into the West Vir­ginia House of Del­e­gates, would cre­ate the “Flex­i­ble Leave Act” to allow employ­ees to take already earned paid leave, and to use that leave for paid time off for an ill­ness of the employ­ee or the employee’s “imme­di­ate fam­i­ly”. The bill does not give employ­ees any addi­tion­al paid leave—it only allows them to take their paid leave that they have already earned under their employ­ers’ poli­cies, and allows the flex­i­bil­i­ty (hence the name, “Flex­i­ble Leave Act”) to take leave that may have been intend­ed for anoth­er pur­pose, such as earned vaca­tion time, and apply it for the dif­fer­ent pur­pose of their own or an imme­di­ate fam­i­ly member’s illness.

On Jan­u­ary 24, 2011, Del­e­gates Caputo, Fra­gale, Hat­field, Mar­tin, and Moye intro­duced House Bill 2770, which is being referred to the Com­mit­tee on Ener­gy, Indus­try and Labor, Eco­nom­ic Devel­op­ment and Small Busi­ness then Finance. You can keep track of the progress of the bill by going to the Bill Sta­tus page and enter­ing 2770 in the “Enter Bill Num­ber” field. For infor­ma­tion on the bill’s spon­sors, or on any oth­er mem­bers of the Sen­ate, you can go to the House Mem­bers page and pick the mem­ber from a drop-down list. For those of you who are inter­est­ed in find­ing out more about the leg­isla­tive process, the Leg­is­la­ture has a “How a Bill Becomes Law” page.  The Leg­is­la­ture also has a very nice pho­to gallery of the Capi­tol Build­ing.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Leg­isla­tive Update: Pend­ing bill would expand sick leave rights for West Vir­ginia employ­ees

Legislative Update: West Virginia legislature may give employers more time to cut final paycheck

Pend­ing West Vir­ginia leg­is­la­tion would, if passed, extend the time employ­ers have to issue a ter­mi­nat­ed employ­ee’s final pay­check, from the cur­rent 72 hours after dis­charge to the next reg­u­lar pay day.

On Jan­u­ary 28, 2011, Sen­a­tors Palum­bo and Klem­pa intro­duced Sen­ate Bill 339, which is being referred to the Labor and Finance Com­mit­tees. You can keep track of the progress of the bill by going to the Bill Sta­tus page and enter­ing 339 in the “Enter Bill Num­ber” field. For infor­ma­tion on the bill’s spon­sors, or on any oth­er mem­bers of the Sen­ate, you can go to the Sen­ate Mem­bers page and pick the mem­ber from a drop-down list.

Sen­ate Bill 339 would amend the WV Wage Pay­ment and Col­lec­tion Act, which deals in part with the oblig­a­tion of an employ­er to issue a final pay­check to an employ­ee with­in a cer­tain peri­od of time.  The Wage Pay­ment and Col­lec­tion Act cur­rent­ly sets two dif­fer­ent dead­lines, depend­ing on whether the employ­ee resigned or was dis­charged.

  • Sec­tion 21–5‑4(b): If an employ­ee is dis­charged, the employ­er must pay the employ­ee all earned wages with­in 72 hours after the discharge.
  • Sec­tion 21–5‑4©: if the employ­ee resigns, the employ­er must pat the employ­ee all earned wages by the next reg­u­lar pay­day, either through “reg­u­lar chan­nels” or, if the employ­ee requests, by mail. There is this addi­tion­al vari­a­tion where the employ­ee resigns: if the employ­ee pro­vides “at least one pay period’s notice of inten­tion to quit”, then the employ­er must pay the employ­ee all earned wages “at the time of quit­ting” (which is the final day worked after giv­ing notice).
Con­tin­ue read­ing Leg­isla­tive Update: West Vir­ginia leg­is­la­ture may give employ­ers more time to cut final pay­check

Legislative Update: Insurance industry seeks amendment to West Virginia Human Rights Act

Insur­ance com­pa­nies have been urg­ing the West Vir­ginia Leg­is­la­ture to pass leg­is­la­tion to over­turn the West Vir­ginia Supreme Court’s deci­sion in Michael v. Appalachi­an Heat­ing, LLC, 701 S.E.2d 116 (June 11, 2010). In Michael, the West Vir­ginia Supreme Court held that the West Vir­ginia Human Rights Act pro­hib­it­ed dis­crim­i­na­tion by an insur­ance com­pa­ny in set­tling claims cov­ered by an insur­ance policy.

The Michael Decision

Gen­er­al­ly, the Human Rights Act pro­hibits dis­crim­i­na­tion (1) in the work­place, (2) in places of pub­lic accom­mo­da­tion (like hotels, shop­ping cen­ters), and (3) in con­nec­tion with trans­ac­tions involv­ing hous­ing and real estate (like rent­ing apart­ments and buy­ing houses).

But at issue in Michael was sec­tion 5–11‑9(7) of the Human Rights Act, which was not lim­it­ed to those three cat­e­gories of activ­i­ty. Here is the rel­e­vant lan­guage in sec­tion 5–11‑9(7)(A);

It shall be an unlaw­ful dis­crim­i­na­to­ry prac­tice [based on race, reli­gion, col­or, nation­al ori­gin, ances­try, sex, age, and disability] …

(7) For any per­son, employ­er, employ­ment agency, labor orga­ni­za­tion, own­er, real estate bro­ker, real estate sales­man or finan­cial insti­tu­tion to:

(A) Engage in [1] any form of threats or reprisal, or to [2] engage in, or hire, or con­spire with oth­ers to com­mit acts or activ­i­ties of any nature, the pur­pose of which is to harass, degrade, embar­rass or cause phys­i­cal harm or eco­nom­ic loss or [3] to aid, abet, incite, com­pel or coerce any per­son to engage in any of the unlaw­ful dis­crim­i­na­to­ry prac­tices defined in this section .…

In sub­part (7)(A) above I have brack­et­ed the three spe­cif­ic caus­es of action (legal the­o­ries) which the Supreme Court said are dis­cernible in sub­part (7)(A). I have also bold­ed the sec­ond cause of action, which was the key cause of action at issue in the Michael case.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Leg­isla­tive Update: Insur­ance indus­try seeks amend­ment to West Vir­ginia Human Rights Act

Cleveland jury awards $900,000 against hospital in age discrimination case

Ellen Simon, an attor­ney in Cleve­land who authors the excel­lent blog, Ellen Simon’s Employ­ee Rights Post, recent­ly tried an age dis­crim­i­na­tion claim for plain­tiff Glo­ria Parks (a phle­botomist) against Cleve­land’s Uni­ver­si­ty Hos­pi­tals Case Med­ical Cen­ter.

Ms. Parks had worked for the hos­pi­tal for 30 years when she was fired over a med­ical mis­take involv­ing her­self and anoth­er much younger employ­ee. The hos­pi­tal fired Ms. Parks, but not the much younger employee.

The jury returned a ver­dict in favor of the plain­tiff (Ms. Parks) for $450,000 for her eco­nom­ic loss and $450,000 for “oth­er com­pen­sato­ry dam­ages”, accord­ing to Ms. Simon’s blog arti­cle. Based on the lim­it­ed infor­ma­tion I have so far, it looks like the “oth­er com­pen­sato­ry dam­ages” was an award for emo­tion­al dis­tress, The jury did not award puni­tive dam­ages.

So the ver­dict totals $900,000, and Ms. Simon will file a request for attor­neys’ fees’ fees and expens­es. While it is not clear from the arti­cle so far, I sus­pect the case was assert­ed for age dis­crim­i­na­tion under Ohio’s Fair Employ­ment Prac­tices Act (and not the fed­er­al ADEA).

Con­tin­ue read­ing Cleve­land jury awards $900,000 against hos­pi­tal in age dis­crim­i­na­tion case

Back from the USSR: FMLA Retaliation, 4th Circuit Decision in Dotson v Pfizer

Retal­i­a­tion law is one of the most devel­op­ing (and dan­ger­ous) areas of employ­ment law. I recent­ly spoke at the West Vir­ginia Employ­ment Lawyers Association’s annu­al con­fer­ence on retal­i­a­tion law, and I want­ed to go back and dis­cuss an impor­tant Fourth Cir­cuit deci­sion on the Fam­i­ly and Med­ical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

Dotson v. Pfizer: Adoption and the FMLA

The deci­sion is Dot­son v. Pfiz­er Inc., 558 F.3d 284 (2009), and involved alle­ga­tions of retal­i­a­tion stem­ming from leave tak­en for an inter­na­tion­al adop­tion from Russia.

The jury award­ed $1,876 in dam­ages on the FMLA inter­fer­ence claim and $331,429.25 on FMLA retal­i­a­tion claim. The judge then award­ed $333,305.25 in statu­to­ry liq­ui­dat­ed dam­ages, $375,000 in attor­neys’ fees, and $14,264.88 in court costs. Both sides appealed. The Fourth Cir­cuit reject­ed all aspects of the employer’s appeal, but found the tri­al court made a mis­take in refus­ing to award the plain­tiff pre-judg­ment interest.

Con­tin­ue read­ing Back from the USSR: FMLA Retal­i­a­tion, 4th Cir­cuit Deci­sion in Dot­son v Pfiz­er